

Externalities

Third intervention will be subsidies:


Policies to encourage an activity and raise Q

Usual rationale:

Activity creates a *positive externality*

Externality:

An unintended cost or benefit created for a third party as a result of a transaction.



Two types:

1. Cost or *negative* externality

Examples: pollution, noise, blighted property

Economics: traders *don't pay the full cost* of their actions

2. Benefit or *positive* externality

Examples: vaccinations, learning effects, landscaping

Economics: traders *don't receive the full benefits* of their actions

Consequence:

If an externality is present the market outcome will be inefficient.

Example: positive externality

Demand and supply:

$$WTP = 100 - Q_M^D$$


$$WTA = 40$$

Externality:

Generates \$5 benefit for every unit traded

Marginal benefit:

$$MB_e = 5$$



Market equilibrium with no policy:


$$WTP = P^d$$

$$WTA = P^s$$

$$P^d = P^s$$

$$100 - Q_M^D = 40$$

$$\text{Market equilibrium: } Q_M^* = 60$$



At $Q_M^* = 60$:

Gains from trade on last unit to traders:

$$WTP - WTA = \$0$$

Pareto improvement possible by raising Q


Consider unit 61:

$$WTP = 100 - 61 = \$39$$

$$WTA = \$40$$

$$MB_e = \$5$$

Possible transaction: third party contributes \$1



Buyer: $CS = WTP - P$
 $CS = \$39 - \$39 = 0$

Seller: $PS = P - WTA$
 $PS = (39 + 1) - 40 = 0$

Outsider: $Net = MB_e - \$1$
 $Net = \$5 - \$1 = \$4$

Pareto improvement:

Makes third party better off without making B or S worse off

Could keep going; on unit 62:

$$WTP = 100 - 62 = 38$$

$$WTA = 40$$

$$MB_e = 5$$

Third party contributes \$2: net gain is $\$5 - \$2 = \$3$

Generalizing: net gain is $(WTP + MB_e) - WTA$

For unit 62: $(38 + 5) - 40 = \$3$

In general: market Q is too low when a positive externality is present:

Market stops at Q where:

$$WTP = WTA$$

But increasing Q improves efficiency when:

$$WTP + MB_e > WTA$$

Efficient Q where no more gains are possible:

$$WTP + MB_e = WTA$$

Handy to define marginal social benefit (MSB):

$$MSB = WTP + MB_e$$

Private benefits (WTP)
plus external benefits (MB_e)

Condition for efficient Q:

$$MSB = WTA$$

Finding the efficient Q in the example:

Construct the MSB curve:

$$MSB = WTP + MB_e$$

$$MSB = 100 - Q_M^D + 5$$

$$MSB = 105 - Q_M^D$$

Find Q where it's equal to WTA:

$$MSB = WTA$$

$$105 - Q_M^D = 40$$

$$Q_M^D = 65$$

Call this Q_M^e to indicate it's the efficient Q:

$$Q_M^e = 65$$

Check it:


$$WTP = 100 - 65 = 35$$

$$MB_e = 5$$

$$MSB = 35 + 5 = 40$$

$$WTA = 40$$

$MSB = WTA$, no further improvements possible



To move the market to the efficient Q, can use a subsidy.


Subsidies

Government or other entity pays for part of a transaction:

Buyer pays: P^d

Government pays: S

New flow of money:



$$P^d + S = P^S$$


No change in the decision rules:

$$WTP = P^d$$

$$WTA = P^S$$

Designing a subsidy for the example model:

Step 1: find P_2^d needed for demand to hit target Q_M^e




$$100 - Q_M^D = P_2^d$$

$$100 - 65 = P_2^d$$

$$P_2^d = 35$$

Step 2: find P_2^S needed to induce supply



$$WTA = P_2^S$$

$$P_2^S = \$40$$

In more complex problems, solve for Q where $P_2^S = WTA(Q_M^e)$

Step 3: use the accounting rule to find S

$$P_2^d + S = P_2^s$$
$$\$35 + S = \$40$$
$$S = \$5$$

Efficient subsidy and MB_e :

In general, S will always be equal to MB_e at Q_M^e

For efficiency want:

$$WTP + MB_e = WTA$$

Effect of subsidy S :

Accounting: $P^d + S = P^s$

Buyer rule: $WTP = P^d$

Seller rule: $WTA = P^s$

Substituting into the accounting rule:

$$WTP + S = WTA$$

Now solve for the S to get to efficiency:

Goal: $WTP + MB_e = WTA$

Accounting: $WTP + S = WTA$

$$WTP + S = WTP + MB_e$$

$$S = MB_e$$

The subsidy should be set equal to the externality.

When MB_e is not be constant the rule applies at the efficient Q:

$$S = MB_e(Q_M^e)$$

Daily exercise 1 on Google Classroom