E: Efficient incentive design, part 2

Summary of the principal-agent (PA) version of the biofuels startup

Participants:

Founder (F):Has idea but no cashVenture capitalist (VC):Has cash but no idea

Payoffs:

Success (S):	\$1M
Failure (F):	\$10k
No startup (N):	\$100k

Founder's effort (E) affects chance of success (S) but is costly to F:

VC pays to F

Retained by F


Level of effort	Cost to F	Prob of S
High (H):	\$5k	20%
Low (L):	\$2k	15%

Case 2: Designing a contract that works

Two parameters:

Fixed payment (Fx)	
Share of ownership (Sh)	

Founder's tree with **Fx** and **Sh** variables:



F's payoffs from effort choice, in thousands:

$$EV_{H} = 0.2 * (Fx - 5 + 1000 * Sh) + 0.8 * (Fx - 5 + 10)$$
$$EV_{H} = Fx + 200 * Sh + 3$$
$$EV_{L} = 0.15 * (Fx - 2 + 1000 * Sh) + 0.85 * (Fx - 2 + 10)$$
$$EV_{L} = Fx + 150 * Sh + 6.5$$

 $EV_N = 100$

IC: What's required for incentive compatibility?

• Want F to choose H: need $EV_H > EV_L$

$$Fx + 200 * Sh + 3 > Fx + 150 * Sh + 6.5$$

200 * Sh + 3 > 150 * Sh + 6.5
50 * Sh > 3.5
Sh > $\frac{3.5}{50}$

Conclusion: Sh > 7%

Need at least 7% ownership to have enough skin in the game

PC: What's required for participation?

• Want payoff from H to beat salary: need $EV_H > EV_N$

Fx + 200 * Sh + 3 > 100

Fx > 97 - 200 * Sh

One possible offer:

VC chooses: Sh = 10%

$$Fx > 97 - 200 * 0.1$$

Fx > 77

Viable offer: Fx = 80

Does it work for the founder?

$$EV_H = 80 + 200 * (0.1) + 3 = 103$$


 $EV_L = 80 + 150 * (0.1) + 6.5 = 101.5$

• Passes IC test: $EV_H > EV_L$

 $EV_N = 100$

- Passes PC test: $EV_H > EV_N$
- Net gain: 103 100 = 3

Is it OK for the VC?



General EV:

$$EV_V = 0.2 * (-Fx + (1 - Sh) * 1000) + 0.8 * (-Fx)$$
$$EV_V = -Fx + 200 * (1 - Sh)$$

This offer:

 $EV_V = -80 + 200 * 0.9$ $EV_V = -80 + 180 = 100$

• Positive for the VC

Overall payoff:

Founder: 3k

VC: 100k

Total: 103k

What happened to the other 5k?

Generalizing to find range of viable contracts:

Founder:

IC:	$EV_H > EV_L$	Sh > 7%
PC:	$EV_H > EV_N$	Fx > 97 - 200 * Sh

VC:

VC: $EV_V > 0$ 200 * (1 - Sh) > Fx

Graphing:

Sh on Y, Fx on X

Intercepts:

IC: *Sh* > 7% Y : 7% X : na

Also, higher Sh is better

PC: Fx > 97 - 200 * Sh


X: Sh = 0, Fx = 97Y: Fx = 0, Sh = 48.5%

Also, higher Fx or Sh is better

VC: 200 * (1 - Sh) > Fx

X: Sh = 0, Fx = 200Y: Fx = 0, Sh = 100%

Also, lower Sh or Fx is better



For reference: intersection of IC, PC Sh = 7%, Fx = 83k