## EV and Insurance Premiums

EV also shows the premium needed to buy an actuarially fair insurance policy

Actuarially fair:

- Premium charged = expected claim
- Insurance company breaks even on average

Very useful when evaluating Pareto efficiency

Example:

Two people: $\quad$ Alice (A), Bob (B)
Different times: A lives now, $B$ lives in the future
One good: Barrel of oil owned by B
Interest rate: $r=0 \%$ for simplicity

A's WTP now:
$\$ 20$

B's WTA in future depends on future car technology:

| State | Probability | WTA |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Electric cars (E) in use | $70 \%$ | $\$ 0$ |
| Gas cars (G) in use | $30 \%$ | $\$ 50$ |

Graphing:


Dilemma: should $A$ use the oil?

| State | $W T P_{A}$ | $W T A_{B}$ | $\Delta S S$ |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| E | 20 | 0 | $+\$ 20$ | Gain if A uses |
| G | 20 | 50 | $-\$ 30$ | Loss if A uses |

Now add an insurance company

## Offers policy that pays out if $\mathbf{G}$ occurs

Insures against the risk that gas cars are still in use
Price: $\quad Z \quad$ premium
Pays if G: $\quad \$ 50 \quad$ coverage or claim if $G$ occurs
Pays if E : $\quad \$ 0 \quad$ claim if E occurs

Expected claim: $0.7 *(\$ 0)+0.3 *(\$ 50)=\$ 15$
Solve for company's WTA:

- Minimum Z for which it would sell the policy

Insurance company's decision tree:


Evaluating the right-most node:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& E V=0.7 *(Z-0)+0.3 *(Z-50) \\
& E V=(0.7+0.3) * Z-(0.7 * 0+0.3 * 50) \\
& E V=Z-15 \\
& \text { sell }+z-15 \\
& \text { No \$0 }
\end{aligned}
$$

Minimum Z to sell the policy (WTA):

$$
\begin{aligned}
& Z-15=0 \\
& Z=15
\end{aligned}
$$

Aside on backing out the probability implicit in a premium:

Z Premium
C Coverage if the event occurs, pays 0 otherwise
$\rho$ Probability of the event
$Z=\rho C+(1-\rho) * 0=\rho C \quad$ Premium for fair insurance
$\rho=\frac{Z}{C}$

SU supplemental life insurance

$$
Z \text { = annual cost per } \$ 1000 \text { coverage }
$$

| Age | $Z$ | $Z / 1000$ | Implied $\rho, \%$ |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 30 | $\$ 0.61$ | 0.00061 | 0.06 |
| 40 | $\$ 0.92$ | 0.00092 | 0.09 |
| 50 | $\$ 2.08$ | 0.00208 | 0.21 |
| 60 | $\$ 5.59$ | 0.00559 | 0.56 |
| 70 | $\$ 17.29$ | 0.01729 | 1.73 |

Back to oil example:

With insurance, an efficient trade is possible

1. Alice buys policy for $\$ 15$ and names Bob as the beneficiary
2. Alice trades policy to Bob for the oil


Welfare impacts?

$$
\begin{array}{lll}
\text { Alice: } & W T P=\$ 20, P=\$ 15 & C S_{A}=\$ 5 \\
\text { Insurer: } & P=\$ 15, W T A=\$ 15 & P S_{I}=\$ 0
\end{array}
$$

Bob's payoff is more complicated since it depends on the state:

| Variable | State E | State G |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| Payment for oil | $\mathbf{\$ 0}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 0}$ |
| Insurance claim | $\mathbf{\$ 0}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 5 0}$ |
| Total payments, $\boldsymbol{P}_{\boldsymbol{T}}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 0}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 5 0}$ |
| $W T A$ | $\mathbf{\$ 0}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 5 0}$ |
| $\boldsymbol{P} \boldsymbol{S}_{\boldsymbol{B}}=\boldsymbol{P}_{\boldsymbol{T}} \mathbf{- W T A}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 0}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 0}$ |

Graphing:


Bob comes out even either way:
No change in either state of the world

Overall:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \Delta S S=C S_{A}+P S_{I}+P S_{B} \\
& \Delta S S=\$ 5+\$ 0+\$ 0=\$ 5
\end{aligned}
$$

Summary:

- EV shows the premium for a fair insurance policy
- Can use to evaluate efficiency under uncertainty

Daily exercise

